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Une forme frondeuse: the function of discontinuity in La 
Rochefoucauld’s Maximes 
 
In 1663 Mme de Sablé circulated privately a small number of copies of La 
Rochefoucauld’s Sentences et maximes de morale (as it was titled at the time); 
this exercise was intended to sound out opinion about the work in advance of 
any publication. Among the extant replies to this consultation, one in particular 
singles out disapprovingly the disjointed nature of the work. Describing the 
reading process in terms of masonry, the anonymous critic states:  
 
On y remarque de belles pierres, j’en demeure d’accord; mais on ne saurait disconvenir qu’il 
ne s’y trouve aussi du moellon et beaucoup de plâtras, qui sont si mal joints ensemble qu’il 
est impossible qu’ils puissent faire corps ni liaison, et par conséquent que l’ouvrage puisse 
subsister.1
 
The critic goes on to claim that the work is nothing but an anthology of 
‘sentences’ and ‘pointes’ culled from more coherent works that had the distinct 
advantage over the Maximes of contextualizing their remarks: ‘car si l’on voyait 
ce qui était devant et après, assurément on en serait plus édifié et moins 
scandalisé’.2  
So even in their earliest form, La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes disturbed, 
unsettled, ‘scandalized’ the reader.3 More particularly, in this instance, it is their 
intentionally stylized discontinuity that impacts on the reading experience. Mme 
de Sablé’s correspondent (as today’s reader too, perhaps) is disconcerted by 
being denied ‘ce qui était devant et après’. In other words, it is the repeated 
closure of the maxims, their insistent refusal to elaborate, that affects the way in 
which they are read and received. Thus the spaces between maxims, the 
‘spectacular’4 blanks on the page, disrupt the reading, punctuate it unevenly, and 
quite literally disarticulate its various statements.  
As far as the reader is concerned then, I would argue that these spaces 
offer instances not of comprehension (taking possession of the text’s meaning) 
but of apprehension (a stalling of meaning and at the same time a coming to 
awareness of something else). And, as its current usage suggests, this 
‘apprehension’ in reading the Maximes is very much tinged with a sense of 
uneasiness and dread, for what the text does effectively is to deny the very thing 
that the maxim was traditionally employed to supply: knowledge, specifically 
the laying down of law. Unlike the maxims of Descartes’s ‘morale par 
provision’ or even Molière’s ‘Maximes du mariage’ in L’Ecole des femmes, La 
Rochefoucauld’s discrete sententiae strip the reader of his/her certainties, 
dispossess the subject of its knowledge and provide blank spaces which both 
invite the reader into the text and represent perfectly his/her newly realized 
absence of understanding.5 Far from accumulating a store of wisdom, the 
disjunctive Maximes induce what can best be called a ‘non-savoir’ in their 
reader. This is recognized by Henri de La Chapelle-Bessé in his ‘Discours’ 
which prefaced the first edition of the Maximes. After claiming the work 
discomfited him, even made him blush at its truths, he writes: ‘mais je sens 
bien, à force de le lire, que si je n’apprends pas à devenir plus sage, j’apprends 
au moins à connaître que je ne le suis pas’.6 In effect, their discontinuities 
dismantle, by means of form, the same pretensions to knowledge, especially 
self-knowledge, ridiculed in their text. 
This induction of the reader into the text of the Maximes via its 
disjunctions is duly noted by the critic Hélène Cazes. She writes: ‘temps de 
l’inconstance, du caprice, du mouvement de la pensée, le blanc interdit 
l’homogénéité et la simplicité – au sens propre – d’une lecture linéaire: il 
marque la place et la part du lecteur’.7 This also suggests another reason for the 
reader’s ‘apprehension’: by allocating the reader a place in the text, more 
particularly by adequating the reader to the maxim, making him or her the 
unspoken counterpart to each sententia, La Rochefoucauld also ascribes to each 
reader the formal ambiguity of each maxim, that is, their relation to the rest of 
the text, what Geoffrey Bennington calls being at once ‘a part of the text and 
apart from the text’.8 As with individual maxims, individual readers occupy a 
place in the text which is both their own, yet which is necessarily occupied by 
others; they become like each maxim, pre-eminent and superfluous, sharing the 
partial, liminal existence of statements which stand in a relation of semi-
autonomy to the work that they compose, equally susceptible to being cited or 
disregarded. Hence this partiality of maxim and maxim-reader is not merely 
formal: it is also ‘partial’ in the sense of ‘partisan’, giving rise to widely 
divergent readings, judgements and feelings in regard of the text. In short, the 
disjunctions of the Maximes evoke a different state of consciousness in the 
reader from that produced by more continuous, coherent texts. 
In the context of mid- to late seventeenth-century France, this alternative 
‘apprehensive’ consciousness brought about by the discontinuous reading of the 
Maximes is particularly opposed to two other states of mind: firstly, the 
continuously reasoning Cartesian consciousness, explicated in the Discours de 
la méthode and applied in the Méditations; and secondly, the equally 
continuous, but characteristically unconscious, operations of ‘amour-propre’ 
itself. In fact, if we turn to Descartes’s Discours de la méthode, we find in the 
very title an explicitly discursive – that is, continuous, flowing, accumulative – 
methodology that opposes it to La Rochefoucauld’s insistent discontinuities.9 
The text itself also makes it apparent that the various objects of Cartesian 
consciousness suppose, indeed are predicated on, the seamless continuity of the 
reasoning mind; that just as consciousness develops ‘ces longues chaînes de 
raisons’, so in the natural world ‘toutes les choses s’entre-suivent en même 
façon’.10 This simultaneous and continuous co-existence of thought and its 
objects culminates in the Cogito itself (‘je pense, donc je suis’) with its 
necessary synchronicity of thought and being. Stylistically, this reliance on 
reason and causality in the Discours translates into a grammar governed by 
liaisons of co-ordination and subordination (‘donc’, ‘à cause de’, ‘au moyen de 
quoi’, ‘d’où vient que’), the very opposite of the discrete juxtapositions of La 
Rochefoucauld’s reflections. Similarly, the object of Descartes’s thought is only 
called into question the better to possess it; his doubt or ‘apprehension’ before 
the world is a preliminary step toward the certain knowledge of it. If anything, 
the Stoic quest for self-mastery is aggressively extended by Descartes in an 
attempted mastery of the natural world; a process in which the aim is to ‘rendre 
sienne’ all objects of consciousness.11 In other words, it is radical 
comprehension, with all that the term implies of appropriation, that Descartes 
pursues in the Discours; and as such, it represents the antithesis of the 
apprehension afforded the reader by La Rochefoucauld’s disappropriating text. 
Yet no less than La Rochefoucauld’s disjunctive exposé, Descartes’s 
Discours also betrays the workings of a certain ‘amour-propre’. For while the 
subject ‘pensant-existant’ of the work suspends all knowledge in doubt, the 
subject telling the tale, sure of its narratorial role and discursive powers, is 
never called into question. In other words, there is a ‘moi’ at work in the 
Discours which guarantees, seemingly unconsciously, the success of the 
Method even as it appears to negate every last comforting certainty. Of course, 
it is precisely this capacity of ‘amour-propre’ to ‘triomphe[r] dans sa propre 
défaite’, denounced by La Rochefoucauld in his famous ‘Maxime supprimée 1’, 
which here characterizes the narratorial strategy of  Descartes’s Discours.12  
I would argue, it is the continually self-regarding machinations of 
‘amour-propre’ which also provide the second type of consciousness opposed 
by La Rochefoucauld’s formal discontinuities and the ‘apprehension’ that they 
generate in the reader. According to established Freudian readings of the 
Maximes, notably those of Doubrovsky and Barthes, ‘amour-propre’ is 
particularly associated with the Unconscious.13 That is, it is associated with the 
activity of our most basic desires and wishes which derive their energy from 
primary physical instincts, often sexual or destructive in nature, and which seek 
only their own immediate satisfaction regardless of any other considerations. 
Moreover, like ‘amour-propre’, these unconscious impulses shift and change 
their objects ceaselessly in a sort of timeless quest for gratification, in which 
‘one [object] may be replaced by another along a whole chain of associations 
that have no rational basis’.14 Yet, La Rochefoucauld’s disjunctive reflections 
are not concerned with defining ‘amour-propre’ per se (as was ‘Maxime 
supprimée 1’) but with charting, both in their discontinuous form and their 
imperious tone, the sporadic and disruptive appearances of ‘amour-propre’ in 
contemporary society.  In other words, the Maximes focus on those specifically 
discontinuous instances where the unconscious ‘amour-propre’ is both fulfilled 
and frustrated in its public expression. Hence, far from identifying with the 
ceaselessly voracious shifting incarnations of ‘amour-propre’ itself, La 
Rochefoucauld’s maxims set out on the page the fleeting, disjunctive eruptions 
of ‘amour-propre’ into society – more specifically, into the consciously policed 
use of language in the society of mid- to late-seventeenth-century France. In 
Freudian terms, then, the stylized discontinuities of the maxims do not 
correspond to the Unconscious itself but to its repeated, irregular attempts to 
enter both consciousness and language. In other words, they correspond 
psychically to that zone or form of thought which at once releases and blocks 
unconscious impulses, and which Freud terms the ‘preconscious’. 
In his important work of 1915 entitled ‘The Unconscious’, Freud 
describes the preconscious as those thought processes ‘capable of becoming 
conscious’.15 Arising more often than not in the Unconscious, these are 
‘psychical acts’ which have not yet attained consciousness. So the preconscious 
acts as a sort of buffer zone between the unconscious and the conscious mind. 
In the repression of dangerous unconscious material, it is the space of negating, 
countering forces mustered in defence of consciousness; yet, in other cases, it 
readily adopts unconscious thoughts and translates them into consciousness. Its 
discontinuities are then precisely those set between maxims: they constitute at 
once a channel of communication and a blocking of communication. Yet Freud 
makes it clear that this filtering of thought, as the maxim-spaces’s filtering of 
meaning, is neither hierarchical nor one-way: it blocks and releases in both 
directions from the Unconscious to the Conscious and vice versa (similarly the 
maxims can be read in reverse order from any given point). More specifically, 
Freud describes the preconscious as that zone of the mind in which thought 
processes are ‘brought into connection with word-presentations’: just as the 
reader’s mind connects with the ‘word-presentations’ of the maxims precisely in 
their intervening spaces.16 Finally, in this vein, I would consider the capacity of 
the Freudian preconscious for standing on the threshold of consciousness while 
itself remaining alien to it, as very similar, if not identical, to the apprehending-
apprehensive spaces of the Maximes which stand on the threshold of 
comprehension (understood here as the full passage of the maxims into 
consciousness/knowledge) while also remaining alien to it. 
Of course, there are other, less arcane reading of the discontinuities of the 
maxims, at least one of which places them firmly (and consciously) in the social 
context of their time. According to this reading, the disjunctions of the Maximes 
represent a knowing appeal to the fashionable casualness, the affected 
negligence, of the worldly salons of 1660s Paris. As Jean Rohou comments, 
their discontinuities correspond to their critical historical moment, demanding 
‘brièveté et diversité’, at the same time finding favour with a cultivated 
audience which ‘n’est plus dominé par les doctes, mais par les mondains, 
qu’ennuient longueur et continuité, à moins qu’elles ne soient romanesques’.17 
So, far from inciting apprehension in their readers or appealing to the 
preconscious mind, the Maximes subscribe to the social aesthetic of the 
‘honnête homme’, a figure seemingly at ease with himself and his fellows, 
whose comportment is characterized by, if anything, a studied self-
consciousness.   
Certainly, there are maxims in La Rochefoucauld’s text which recognize 
positively the reflexive and sociable nature of ‘honnêteté’, specifically maxim 
206: ‘C’est être véritablement honnête homme que de vouloir être toujours 
exposé à la vue des honnêtes gens’. Maxim 202 inflects this mutual policing of 
manners more critically, emphasizing the necessity for personal, moral honesty 
beneath the public displays of ‘honnêteté’: ‘Les faux honnêtes gens sont ceux 
qui déguisent leurs défauts aux autres et à eux-mêmes. Les vrais honnêtes gens 
sont ceux qui les connaissent parfaitement et les confessent’. And here a crucial 
distinction has been introduced into La Rochefoucauld’s conception of 
‘honnêteté’: that of authenticity or sincerity. Elaborating on the implicit 
‘véritablement honnête’ of maxim 206, La Rochefoucauld states that there are 
essentially two types of ‘honnête homme’: the true and the false, the morally 
honest individual and the self-deluding hypocrite who has only the outward 
show of honesty (here ‘honnêteté’ is closer in meaning perhaps to Montaigne’s 
‘naïveté’). In other words, ‘honnêteté’ is often only one more cover for the 
machinations of ‘amour-propre’ and self-interest, just another vice 
masquerading as a virtue. Maxim 170 spells out the moralist’s suspicions 
regarding the deeper motivation behind apparently ‘honnête’ acts: ‘Il est 
difficile de juger si un procédé net, sincère et honnête est un effet de probité ou 
d’habileté’. And, of the relatively small number of other maxims concerned 
with ‘honnêteté’, the majority identify it as a specifically female form of 
deception and self-deception. For instance, maxim 368 states cruelly: ‘La 
plupart des honnêtes femmes sont des trésors cachés, qui ne sont en sûreté que 
parce qu’on ne les cherche pas’.18  
In fact, as a social norm which, in its most extreme expression, happily 
equates moral values to aesthetic ones, where being good usually means 
appearing good, ‘honnêteté’ sits very uneasily with the critical and denunciatory 
project of the Maximes.19 As Larry Norman has pointed out: ‘La bienséance 
demande qu’on ne démasque pas les vices d’autrui; les maximes, par contre, 
proclament ce projet comme leur raison d’être’.20 The Maximes are 
fundamentally opposed to the double mimesis of the ‘honnête homme’ which 
consists of a formal code  of ‘vraisemblance’ in one’s speech and writing and a 
social code of  ‘bienséance’ in one’s conduct and manners.21 This world of 
seamless appearances, however aesthetically plausible or socially agreeable, is 
anathema to La Rochefoucauld’s disruptive project of revealing the unseemly 
motives behind one’s seemingly consistent words and actions, a project which 
finds its discursive correlative in his disjunctive prose. In other words, the social 
mimetism of the ‘honnête homme’ is denounced as a façade behind which 
other, violently anti-social forces (‘amour-propre’, self-interest) operate unseen; 
equally, his formal mimetism is shattered, disrupted, troubled precisely by the 
discontinuities of the Maximes which reject the order of smooth representation 
cultivated by the ‘honnête homme’ in favour of the fractured, jarring 
presentation of their unbecoming, but none the less sincere, truths.   
It is perhaps significant that the most concerted attempts to rehabilitate 
the figure of the ‘honnête homme’ in La Rochefoucauld’s prose come, not in his 
maxims, but in his Réflexions.  While certain maxims, such as 182, share the 
Réflexions more general acceptance of certain social institutions, however 
flawed, the latter posthumously published pieces go much further in their 
reconciliation of ‘honnêteté’ with moral and social criticism.  As such, E.D 
James draws largely on the Réflexions to temper Jean Starobinski’s claims that 
La Rochefoucauld’s work is that of a radical moral skeptic challenging all social 
constructions, including the polite sociability of the ‘honnête homme’ himself.22 
Stylistically, a correlation is discernible: the more continuous and composed the 
prose (Réflexions), the more conciliatory the attitude towards ‘honnêteté’; the 
more discrete and peremptory the moral judgements (Maximes), the more 
negative and denunciatory the use of the same term. 
Hence the discontinuities of the maxims would seem to run counter to La 
Chapelle-Bessé’s use of the trope of the mirror, privileged by the ‘honnête 
homme’, to describe La Rochefoucauld’s prose as ‘le miroir qui nous fait voir 
nos défauts’.23 Similarly, the maxims cannot be equated formally to ‘réflexions’, 
insofar as this term has optical connotations, even if it was allegedly favoured 
by La Rochefoucauld himself.24 In this instance, it is the readers who impose 
their title on the work, consistently dubbing the collection, ‘les Maximes’. This 
signifies the primacy of the maxims as a reading experience, one in which, as I 
have shown, their discontinuities have a major effect. They are not then a mirror 
held up to society, unless it be a very cracked, fractured, even shattered glass. 
Although they constitute a striking object of perception to the reader, and 
occasion a certain self-examination, the maxims are above all a form of 
expression, that is, they engage in a certain linguistic dynamic with the reader. 
As Philip E. Lewis writes in an article on the discourse of the maxim: ‘the forms 
of perception and language are fundamentally perceptual and lingual, are to be 
apprehended in their own terms.  […] The forms of truth in the maxim must be 
conceived as the forms of language’.25 The distinction I am attempting to make 
is perhaps best explained by considering, as Lewis does,  another famous 
reading of the Maximes, that of La Fontaine in his fable, ‘L’Homme et son 
image’. 
In this fable La Fontaine tells the tale of an ugly yet narcissistic man who 
flees the many mirrors disabusing him of his self-admiration in worldly society. 
He arrives in an isolated rural spot where a stream, which La Fontaine calls ‘un 
canal’, also reflects his image. Yet the stream is so beautiful that the man cannot 
tear himself away from its truthful reflection of his ugliness. La Fontaine ends 
by explicating fully the meaning of his fable: 
 
Notre âme, c’est cet Homme amoureux de lui-même; 
Tant de Miroirs, ce sont les sottises d’autrui, 
Miroirs, de nos défauts les Peintres légitimes;  
Et quant au Canal, c’est celui 
Que chacun sait, le Livre des Maximes.26
 
As Lewis perceptively notes here, the Maximes themselves are not portrayed as 
a mirror and do not belong to the social order; they belong to the natural order 
and are presented as a stream (‘Canal’).27 Hence La Rochefoucauld’s text is 
water, not glass; an element, not a thing; a medium, not an object: it is formed 
of language, not perception. Thus, as a medium, it moves, changes and can be 
entered into; as such, it does not offer reflection, a smooth and plausible re-
presentation of oneself, but refraction, a distorted image which La Fontaine 
suggests is nonetheless more truthful and sincere than that of the polished 
mirror. And this notion of refraction precisely captures the way in which the 
maxims are disjunctive, are informed by a fractured, displacing dynamic of 
reading. The reader dips in and out of maxims which provide him/her with an 
ugly but truthful insight into the discontinuities of his/her own existence, the 
contrary of the mirror’s smooth reflection of an illusory world. 
 So both the polite self-consciousness and the trope of the mirror 
associated with the ‘honnête homme’ are challenged, upset by the formal 
discontinuities of the Maximes; a claim which also carries an implicit yet 
significant political edge. It is a fairly common assumption that by the 1660s La 
Rochefoucauld had turned from the subversive pursuit of individual glory, as in 
the Fronde, to the conformist codes of ‘honnêteté’; that ‘the art of war [had 
been] replaced by the art of conversation’, as D.J. Culpin puts it.28 In other 
words, he had left behind the reckless heroism, and equally reckless egoism, of 
the Fronde for the comforts of social integration and submission afforded to the 
politically accommodating figure of the ‘honnête homme’. Yet, as we have 
seen, the disruptive and disjunctive form of his maxims seems to bely this 
image of the moralist. Far from acquiescing to the conformism of ‘honnêteté’, 
La Rochefoucauld exposes its politely concealed, baser motives and impulses, 
using a form – the maxim – that classically brooks no reply, that closes out 
rhetorical argument. His sententiae therefore constitute the very opposite of the 
‘honnête homme’’s formally and socially accommodating codes of 
‘vraisemblance-bienséance’. Ironically, born of the ‘honnête’ conversations and 
literary games of the salon, the maxim in La Rochefoucauld’s hands seeks to 
deny intercourse, and to have the last word.  Its very discontinuity signals a less 
than polite silencing of the opposition.   
 But just what is this opposition to the Maximes? Socially it is the doxa, 
the voice of received wisdom; politically, it is the centralized and centralizing 
voices of authority, those concurring to promote the absolutist state in the 1650s 
and 1660s. Of course, the absolutism challenged by these mutliple-voiced, 
conflicting maxims is not one realized in practice so much as one maintained in 
principle. The Maximes work against an ideological tendency to absolutism 
which is to a certain extent divorced from the socio-economic realities of mid-
seventeenth-century France, but which is nonetheless propagated there as a 
political ideal. They also suggest that this new anti-absolutism is to be one of 
form not content; a suggestion reinforced by La Rochefoucauld’s removal from 
the second edition in 1666 of those few sententiae whose barely disguised 
critique of Louis XIV and his authority might cause offence (see MS 40, 41, 
68). This, I would contend, is not so much an act of reconciliation or 
repentence, but a strategic decision by La Rochefoucauld to suppress any 
maxim whose content might detract from its form. For the second, and 
subsequent, editions saw an accompanying honing, a literal sharpening, of the 
remaining maxims. It is as though the ‘pointe’ of the maxim becomes 
increasingly a formal discursive substitute for the discarded sword of the rebel 
grand seigneur. Consequently,  the sense of ‘apprehension’, even of scandal, 
inspired in certain readers by the Maximes can be interpreted not just as a 
reaction to an insistent dispossession of knowledge but also to a political 
disarming, even as their author arms himself with the ‘pointes’ and ‘traits’ of 
the maxims. Even the appeal of the maxims to the preconscious can be read 
politically as a challenge to the paradigm of the ever-vigilant and all-
comprehending consciousness not only of Cartesianism but also of the 
absolutist monarchy, both sanctioned in the final analysis by a conception of 
God as the sole perfectly continuous consciousness (Cartesianism), or the only 
ceaselessly legitimating discourse (absolutism). After the failures and betrayals 
of the Fronde, La Rochefoucauld is nothing if not a political pragmatist; a point 
that E.D. James makes well.29 However, his pragmatism is in no way to be 
confused with political conformism to the prevailing doctrines of Church and 
State, and the jarring of his discontinuous maxims is perhaps only a formal 
reproduction of their discord with other social and political sensibilities of the 
time, for instance, those of the ‘honnête homme’ à la Méré.   
 To conclude, the formal discontinuities of La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes 
function on many different levels. This essay has focussed specifically on their 
impact in a phenomenological sense, since it has dealt successively with the 
relationship of sententious discontinuity, as realized in La Rochefoucauld’s 
Maximes, with the Cartesian, Freudian and ‘honnête’ modes of (self-) 
consciousness. Interestingly, in each instance, the principal effect of these 
discontinuities is evoke an alternative state of consciousness in the reader; to 
make him or her apprehensive, questioning his or her existential authenticity or 
sincerity, so to speak. Yet it is worth noting that such discontinuity is not, 
however, a synonym for the demolition of any given mode of consciousness; 
their disjunctive remarks trouble more than they destroy. 
 
(Word-count including footnotes: 4,438) 
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